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S O C I A L  S C I E N C E S
Evidence that investors penalize female founders 
for lack of industry fit
Dana Kanze1*, Mark A. Conley2, Tyler G. Okimoto3, Damon J. Phillips4, Jennifer Merluzzi5
Are female founding CEOs penalized when raising funds for their ventures based on industry served? Across an 
observational study conducted on ventures seeking funding (N = 392) and an experimental study conducted on 
investors allocating venture funding (N = 130), we find evidence for a “lack of fit” effect: Female-led ventures ca-
tering to male-dominated industries receive significantly less funding at significantly lower valuations than female- 
led ventures catering to female-dominated industries. In contrast, male-led ventures attain similar funding and 
valuation outcomes regardless of the gender dominance of the industries to which they cater. We confirm that 
this is because investors perceive lower degrees of fit between founding CEO and venture for female-led ventures 
catering to male- as opposed to female-dominated industries (with no perceived fit differences for male-led ven-
tures across industries). Degree of investor sophistication emerges as a potential attenuating factor, appearing to 
help reduce gender bias from perceived lack of fit.
INTRODUCTION
Although efforts undertaken by public policymakers and practi-
tioners show promising momentum, gender inequality persists 
worldwide, thwarting women’s representation and earnings poten-
tial (1). The majority of labor markets today remain male dominated 
in terms of percentage employment (2), and women in industries 
marked by male dominance continue to experience a variety of ad-
verse consequences in terms of compensation, promotion, retention, 
support, and opportunities for valued leadership (3–8). As one means 
to gain entry into industries where access is limited, women and 
other underrepresented groups may seek to employ themselves and 
others by founding entrepreneurial ventures (9–11).
Through entrepreneurship, female founders recognize a chance 
to sidestep institutionalized hiring and promotion processes oper-
ating inside organizations where bias is ingrained (12, 13). As evi-
dence, growth in business ownership has been largely driven by 
people of color and by women, with the biggest gains in businesses 
owned and operated by women emerging in male-dominated in-
dustries (14, 15). The growth rate in businesses majority owned, 
operated, and controlled by one or more women between 2014 and 
2019 was 21% versus 9% for all businesses, increasing the most in 
three industries that constitute male-dominated labor markets (2): 
utilities (160% growth), construction (68% growth), and information 
(36% growth). But what if women are also disadvantaged when en-
tering male-dominated industries through entrepreneurship, despite 
the access that it provides?
Recently, Tak and colleagues found that a male-typed product—
craft beer—was evaluated less favorably when described as produced 
by a woman rather than by a man, while men and women received 
similar evaluations for producing a female-typed product—cupcakes 
(16). This product-oriented finding represents the transference of 
an effect that has long been observed in the labor market; women 
are devalued when entering male-dominated work environments, 
while the same devaluation does not often extend to men in female- 
dominated work environments—in fact, men working in female- 
dominated industries at times even benefit (17–20). Although the 
literature has established biased evaluations that can diminish the 
outcomes of women (but not men) in gender-inconsistent contexts, 
it is unclear whether this gender interaction can transfer to male- 
versus female-led ventures.
As future directions for entrepreneurship, Tak and colleagues 
(16) encouraged researchers to explore whether this gender interac-
tion effect generalizes beyond food and beverage products, whether 
a dollar amount allocated to male- versus female-typed products 
may emerge as significant in categories with larger price variations, 
and whether the effect also applies to relevant actors like investors 
and founders. Here, we set out to answer these calls by investigating 
whether investors are willing to allocate different amounts of fund-
ing to male versus female founders of ventures operating across in-
dustries with varying degrees of gender dominance. In terms of this 
phenomenon applying to venture funding efforts, Brooks and col-
leagues proposed that industry type is a productive avenue for fu-
ture researchers to explore boundary conditions of the gendered 
funding effects they found, reasoning that “Heilman’s lack-of-fit 
model suggests women may be more persuasive when they pitch 
female gender-typed ventures” [(21), p. 4429].
Supported by decades of research, the Lack of Fit model demon-
strates that women face discrimination when there is a mismatch or 
“lack of fit” between the attributes perceived necessary for success 
in a male-typed domain and those that women are stereotypically 
believed to have (22–26). As a consequence, women are expected to 
be less capable than their male colleagues in male-dominated work 
contexts unless objective evidence of actual task performance proves 
otherwise (27). Venture funding allocations are particularly vulner-
able to this gender bias that underlies the lack of fit phenomenon. 
That is because early-stage investment decisions are made under con-
ditions of high uncertainty in the absence of historical track records 
within the entrepreneurship setting where gender is salient (28–33).
This context can induce an overreliance on heuristics like repre-
sentativeness (34, 35), where evaluators recall the most representa-
tive types as the basis for decision-making and neglect other key 
information at hand. For example, one data point relevant to inves-
tor decision-making is the low overall base rate of venture-funded 
chief executive officers (CEOs) that is likely to be neglected when 
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recalling relative demographic frequencies such as those specific to 
gender (36). An investor’s gender archetype of the “funded found-
ing CEO” is likely to be male; when a female founding CEO seeks 
funding for a venture, perceptions of her “fit” are subject to several 
strikes. Women experience low representation in venture capital, 
with female-founded ventures receiving less than 3% of overall 
funding in the United States (36). At the same time, women also 
endure low representation in U.S. top management teams, account-
ing for only 6% of CEO positions across S&P 500 companies (37). 
According to the Lack of Fit model, founders who deviate from the 
archetype of a male venture–funded CEO are likely met with in-
creased skepticism from investors, translating into a lower success 
rate in female founding CEO attempts to secure funding for their 
respective ventures.
The Lack of Fit model also suggests that women’s attempts to 
raise capital would be particularly challenging when their ventures 
cater to male-dominated industries—or those where women repre-
sent a numerical minority of total employed (2)—constituting a third 
strike against female founding CEOs. Gendered expectations about 
the specific industries where male versus female leaders are likely to 
have subject matter expertise serve as an additional source of infor-
mation that can potentially attenuate or exacerbate an investor’s 
concerns over lack of fit. When female founding CEOs trespass into 
male-dominated industry territory where they are not considered a 
representative type, a perceived lack of industry fit is likely to con-
firm investor trepidation about the venture opportunity. On the 
other hand, when female founding CEOs address female-dominated 
labor markets where they are well represented and perceived to be a 
fit, industry information may act as a compensatory mechanism for 
raising capital. Men are unlikely to be affected by industry informa-
tion; male founding CEOs are apt to be perceived as a natural fit 
when raising funds—both in terms of representation in venture 
capital and in an executive capacity—and therefore have no fit defi-
cit for which to compensate through industry served or otherwise.
Together, we hypothesized that female founding CEOs are likely 
to experience significantly worse funding outcomes for their early- 
stage ventures than male founding CEOs, particularly in male- 
dominated industries where there is a perceived lack of fit (while 
male-led ventures will enjoy comparable funding outcomes regard-
less of industry served based on the Lack of Fit model).
Overview of the studies
To maximize both external and internal validity, we used a mixed 
methods approach offering correlational and causal evidence by 
coupling (i) an observational study of actual funding raised by com-
parable ventures led by female versus male founding CEOs across 
industries of varying gender dominance with (ii) an experimental 
study of funding allocated by investors to ventures led by female 
versus male founding CEOs catering to male- versus female- 
dominated industries. The latter study enabled us to capture an 
additional dependent variable of the valuation at which investors 
allocate funding, as well as to explore a potential mechanism and 
attenuating factor for the effect. Across the two studies, we report 
results both with and without controls and both as raw dollar 
amounts and as natural log (“ln” or “logged”) amounts to account 
for skewness potential (38).
Study 1
We hypothesized that the interaction between founding CEO gen-
der and industry gender dominance predicts venture funding per-
formance. To test whether there is a correlational association among 
these variables, we first conducted an observational study by screen-
ing the Crunchbase venture database for all ventures with disclosed 
aggregate funding data that launched at the prestigious TechCrunch 
Disrupt “TCD” launch competition in the United States (N = 392; 
meanventure age = 5.58; SD = 2.35; 83.2% male led); see Table 1 for 
summary statistics. TCD enabled us to execute on our selection 
strategy: to conduct an apples-to-apples comparison of actual early- 
stage ventures with male versus female founding CEOs who actively 
engage in fundraising attempts.
When addressing the issue of the gender gap in venture funding, it 
is important to acknowledge that there are both demand- and supply- 
side factors at play (31). To isolate supply-side factors involving 
gender bias at the hands of investors supplying capital, researchers 
must make every effort to hold the demand for capital constant 
among the ventures examined. This involves not only subjecting 
statistical models to factors that can affect funding decisions but 
also, first and foremost, departing from a sample of comparable 
ventures in terms of baseline funding quality, intellectual property, 
scalability, and stage. To be accepted into the TCD competition, 
each founding CEO must demonstrate the venture’s high degree of 
quality, need and desire for capital, as well as the ability to scale 
with the use of proceeds of that capital, while having a technological 
component (as the competition name suggests). At the same time, 
TCD features ventures that cater to a wide variety of end users. Hence, 
TCD allows for the technological consistency combined with the 
industry variance that is crucial to investigate our research question.
The resulting sample of U.S.-launched tech ventures of compa-
rable quality, capital need, and stage thus enabled us to draw exter-
nally valid conclusions about the funding outcomes experienced by 
male versus female founders of U.S. tech ventures seeking capital 
across industries over time. We then captured and verified controls 
for each founding CEO and venture by using the full TCD sample 
with completeness of information. TCD participation facilitated 
key model adjustments, including a venture quality measure of 
competition performance for the entire sample, along with verifi-
able data on founding CEO gender and age, as well as venture 
launch location, launch year, and operating status. We then matched 
the Crunchbase industry classification for each TCD venture to that 
Table 1. Study 1 summary statistics.  
Venture funding raised average $16,739,338
Male-led venture funding average $18,509,448
Female-led venture funding 
average $7,996,069
Operating count 214
Closed count 105
Acquired count 72
IPO count 1
SF launch count 201
NY launch count 191
Male founding CEO count 326
Female founding CEO count 66
TCD finalist distinction count 115
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of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (2), which provided the 
percentage of women employed by industry as our continuous mea-
sure of industry gender dominance. We also converted this measure 
into categories of gender dominance to enrich our comparisons.
See Materials and Methods and the Supplementary Materials for 
more details and Table 2 for descriptive statistics and correlations. 
Table 2 reveals a significant positive correlation of ln funding with 
venture quality [indicating whether the venture was a contestant 
versus a finalist at TCD, consistent with (16) findings on influence 
of status] and with operating status (indicating whether or not 
closed) but a significant negative correlation of ln funding with fe-
male founding CEO gender, as predicted. Notably, founding CEO 
gender does not have a significant correlation with key variables 
such as venture quality, helping to dismiss the alternative explana-
tion that female-led ventures receive less funding because they are 
inferior to male-led ventures.
Study 2
We complemented these correlational results with a controlled ex-
periment conducted on actual investors to determine whether there 
is a causal association between study 1’s gender interaction and 
funding outcomes, as well as whether this effect is attributable to 
perceived lack of fit and whether the effect can somehow be reduced. 
To maximize external validity, we engaged leading survey and panel 
provider Qualtrics to recruit real-world investors (N = 130) who 
have made actual venture investments in the United States (see the 
Supplementary Materials for simulations conducted to determine 
sample size). Our participating investors are representative of U.S. 
angel investors in terms of key characteristics such as age, gender, 
ethnicity, education, experience, and industry focus (39), with mean 
age of 51.63 years (SD = 16.21), 67.7% male, 86.2% identifying with 
white ethnicity, 100.0% reporting to have a bachelor’s or graduate 
degree, and mean years of investing experience of 9.01 (SD = 3.19), 
with 57.7% reporting to have 8 or more years of investing experi-
ence. Participants reported catering to a wide variety of industries, 
including financial services, healthcare, consumer goods or services, 
and education that are among the most common areas of focus for 
U.S. angels. We observed that the investing experience among our 
investor participants is professional in nature; 95% invested in seed, 
Series A and B (versus only pre-seed) stages, and 79% participated 
in angel, crowdfunding, and venture funding (as opposed to pure 
“friends and family”) rounds.
In study 2, we desired to see whether fit (versus lack of fit) of 
founding CEO gender and industry gender dominance would cause 
investors to allocate more (versus less) funding to female- but not 
male-led ventures. We separately wanted to determine whether this 
effect also holds for venture valuations, the dollar amount at which 
investors allocate funding based on the venture’s estimated worth. 
In doing so, we were likewise able to calculate the implied equity 
that each founding CEO would retain after the investor’s stake is 
taken. Last, we sought to explore whether perceived fit serves as an 
explanatory mechanism for the effect and what—if any—attenuating 
factors can help to reduce it.
To maximize the ecological validity of a typical investor decision- 
making context, we used a within-subjects, counterbalanced design 
that exposed investor participants to fit versus lack of fit across four 
venture opportunities via a 2 (male versus female founding CEOs) 
× 2 (male-dominated versus female-dominated industries) proce-
dure. In doing so, we manipulated actual Crunchbase venture pro-
files from study 1, all within the highest echelon of funding and 
quality based on competition performance and serving industries 
with comparable degrees of female versus male dominance. We 
held constant relevant information on both the ventures and the 
founders associated with each opportunity while maintaining the 
appearance of profile variation for authenticity of decision-making 
(see Materials and Methods for details and fig. S2 for profile visual-
ization). This within-subjects design affords high internal validity, 
increased statistical power critical for difficult-to-obtain samples 
like investors, and high ecological validity for environments such as 
investing where the evaluator is likely to face a decision involving 
multiple choices; disadvantages of this design have been addressed 
by randomizing order of exposure using a counterbalancing proce-
dure (40). Last, within-subjects design allowed us to embrace a more 
conservative approach by facilitating explicit comparative evalua-
tions of multiple candidates’ performance; separate evaluation en-
abled by between-subjects design is likely to have induced even greater 
reliance on gender stereotypes (41).
As outcome variables, we captured the U.S. dollar funding amounts 
allocated to each venture out of a total capped amount available for 
allocation across the four ventures (31), as well as uncapped U.S. 
dollar valuations for each venture. For our explanatory variable, we 
recognized that it is not only necessary to demonstrate that signifi-
cant differences in perceived lack of fit drive our effect. It is also 
Table 2. Study 1 descriptive statistics and correlations. Ln funding (logged aggregate funds raised); BLS percentage (percentage women employed); 
founder gender (female founding CEO = 1); founder age category (0 to 2); launch location (0, 1); launch year (2010 to 2018); venture quality (0, 1); venture industry 
(1 to 12); venture “operate” operating status (0, 1). †P < 0.10, *P < 0.05, **P < 0.01, and ***P < 0.001. 
M SD 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 Ln funding 12.64 5.73 −0.02 −0.24*** 0.11* 0.08 0.01 0.21*** 0.05 0.28***
2 BLS percentage 44.32 17.85 0.27*** 0.02 0.01 0.01 −0.12* −0.05 −0.01
3 Founder gender 0.17 0.37 0.04 0.04 0.22*** −0.04 0.01 0.03
4 Founder age 0.84 0.70 0.16** −0.06 −0.00 0.08 0.11*
5 Launch location 0.51 0.50 0.06 0.00 0.17*** 0.09†
6 Launch year 2013 2.35 0.02 0.09† 0.29***
7 Venture quality 0.29 0.46 0.04 0.07
8 Venture industry 7.84 3.65 0.10*
9 Venture operate 0.73 0.44
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imperative to demonstrate that the effect is not due to any differ-
ences in the perceptions of the standalone ventures and their re-
spective founders. As such, we not only asked investors to report the 
extent to which each opportunity conveyed a sense of fit between 
the founding CEO and the venture served; we also asked them to 
report the extent to which each opportunity conveyed a sense of 
the venture’s quality and trust in each founding CEO’s ability to 
execute—factors deemed integral to investor decision-making when 
evaluating early-stage tech ventures (30–32, 42–47). We report our re-
sults controlling for self-reported investor gender, age, years of in-
vesting experience, and accreditation status as a proxy for investor 
sophistication [accredited investors are those granted special status 
to invest in higher-risk securities due to their financial sophistica-
tion, as per SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) Rule 501 
under Regulation D of the Securities Act of 1933]. See Table 3 for 
descriptive and correlational statistics, which indicate that our key 
outcome measures of ln funding and ln valuation have a significant 
positive correlation with each other as well as with perceived fit and 
experimental condition, while each has a significant negative cor-
relation with the gender of the founding CEO, as hypothesized.
RESULTS
Study 1
Consistent with prior scholarly findings (31) and overall industry 
statistics (36), founding CEO gender (F = 1) was a significant stand-
alone predictor of logged funding [B   =  −3.75, SE  =  0.75, 
t(390) = −4.99, P < 0.001] and remained a significant predictor 
when introducing our model adjustments (Table 4, models 1 to 3). 
On a raw dollar amount basis, male-led ventures received $18.5 million 
on average in funding, more than 2.3 times the $8.0 million raised 
on average by female-led ventures. As hypothesized, the influence of 
founding CEO gender on logged funding was moderated by the degree 
of industry gender dominance, for a significant founding CEO gender 
and industry gender dominance interaction of B = 0.16, SE = 0.04, 
t(388) = 4.45, P < 0.001. After adjusting our model for factors that can 
influence funding outcomes, the interaction remained significant: B = 
0.12, SE = 0.04, t(382) = 3.33, P < 0.001, and our full model fit the data 
well: F(9, 382) = 11.62, adjusted R2 = 19.64, P < 0.001 (Table 4, model 3).
We also converted the continuous measure of industry gender 
dominance into categories of female-dominated industries (i.e., 
56% or higher women employed) versus male-dominated industries 
(i.e., 44% or lower women employed) versus gender-neutral indus-
tries (i.e., 45 to 55% women employed) to examine results both 
across and within gender. These categories correspond to robust-
ness thresholds of recent work conducted on gender-dominated 
sectors (48); see the Supplementary Materials for sensitivity analy-
ses confirming that interaction effects are consistent on the basis of 
alternative thresholds for industry categorization and a binary in-
dustry classification, as well as results of supplementary analyses 
conducted specifically on gender-neutral industries. When catering 
to male-dominated industries that represent a lack of fit for women, 
male-led ventures raised $21.8 million on average, over 10 times the 
$2.1 million raised on average by female-led ventures (with lnfunding 
diff = 7.84, P < 0.001, indicated by post hoc comparisons using 
Tukey’s post hoc test). In contrast, the funding gap between male- 
and female-led ventures was nonsignificant in female-dominated indus-
tries where there is no lack of fit for women: lnfunding diff = 0.92, 
P = 0.968. See Fig. 1 comparisons. Comparisons of funding differences 
within founding CEO gender indicated that female founding CEOs are 
disadvantaged when raising funds for ventures in industries marked 
by lack of fit, raising 6.7 times more in raw funding when their ventures 
catered to female- rather than male-dominated industries: lnfunding 
diff = 6.47, P < 0.001. Conversely, industry fit did not matter for male 
founding CEOs: lnfunding diff = 0.44, P = 0.992. See Fig. 2 comparisons.
Study 2
Our results reinforced study 1’s findings in a controlled environ-
ment and adjusting our linear mixed effects models for key investor 
characteristics: We observed a significant main effect of founding 
CEO gender (F = 1) on logged funding allocations [B = −0.51, 
SE = 0.22, t(125) = −2.30, P = 0.022], as well as on our additional 
dependent variable measure of logged venture valuations [B = −1.00, 
SE = 0.26, t(125) = −3.85, P < 0.001], with female founding CEOs 
receiving significantly lower amounts on both measures than male 
founding CEOs. Notably, we again observed a significant interac-
tion effect of founding CEO gender and industry gender dominance 
on funding allocations [B = 1.83, SE = 0.43, t(123) = 4.29, P < 0.001] 
Table 3. Study 2 descriptive statistics and correlations. Founder “Entrep” gender, industry gender dominance, and investor gender (female = 1). Perceived fit 
(1 to 7 rating scale). Investor age (number of years old). Investor years of experience “Investor exper” (coded as 1 to 12, with 12 indicating “10+ years”). Investor 
accreditation status “Investor accred” (1 if accredited). *P < 0.05, **P < 0.01, and ***P < 0.001. 
M SD 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 Condition 2.50 1.12 0.24*** 0.20*** 0.00 0.45*** 0.12** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 Ln funding 10.86 2.52 0.47*** −0.10* 0.17*** 0.31*** −0.05 −0.02 −0.02 0.10*
3 Ln valuation 12.54 3.70 −0.13** 0.09* 0.17*** −0.02 −0.06 −0.04 −0.10*
4 Entrep gender 0.50 0.50 0.00 −0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 Industry gender 0.50 0.50 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
6 Perceived fit 5.23 1.21 −0.14** −0.28*** −0.22*** 0.33***
7 Investor gender 0.32 0.47 0.03 0.09* −0.23***
8 Investor age 51.63 16.21 0.58*** −0.42***
9 Investor exper 9.01 3.19 −0.27***
10 Investor accred 0.45 0.50
 on N
ovem
ber 25, 2020
http://advances.sciencem
ag.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Kanze et al., Sci. Adv. 2020; 6 : eabd7664     25 November 2020
S C I E N C E  A D V A N C E S  |  R E S E A R C H  A R T I C L E
5 of 10
as well as on our additional measure of venture valuations [B = 2.68, 
SE = 0.50, t(123) = 5.40, P < 0.001], whereby ventures led by female 
but not male founding CEOs were placed at a funding and valuation 
disadvantage for lack of industry fit. See Table 5 for linear mixed 
effect model results.
Examining the raw coefficient value, this gender interaction ac-
counted for $61,068 in funding out of a $400,000 funding cap across 
all four ventures. Post hoc comparisons revealed that the female 
founding CEO of the venture targeting the female-dominated in-
dustry was allocated $50,137 more out of the $400,000 capped fund-
ing than the female founding CEO targeting the male-dominated 
industry (lnfunding diff = 1.76; P < 0.001), while the difference in 
funding allocations for male founding CEOs targeting male- versus 
female-dominated industries was not significant (P = 0.997), as per 
Fig. 3. Similar comparisons indicated that the female-led venture 
targeting the female-dominated industry received a $2.27 million 
higher valuation on average than the female-led venture targeting the 
male-dominated industry (lnvaluation diff = 2.00; P < 0.001), while the 
difference in valuations for male-led ventures targeting male- versus 
female-dominated industries was not significant (P = 0.425).
As to the driver of this interaction effect, our 1 to 7 rating scale 
measures revealed that investor participants rated the standalone 
quality of each venture and their trust in the standalone founding 
CEO of each venture similarly regardless of industry for both the 
female- and male-led ventures [all P values n.s. (not significant), 
enabling the elimination of these factors as drivers]. The only sig-
nificant rating scale difference was identified in the degree of per-
ceived fit predicted by an interaction between the founding CEO 
and the venture: B = 0.48, SE = 0.15, t(123) = 3.17, P = 0.002. Post 
hoc comparisons of our experimental conditions indicated that the 
female founding CEO of the venture in the female-dominated in-
dustry was perceived to have a significantly better venture fit than 
the female founding CEO of the venture in the male-dominated in-
dustry (fit diff = 0.40, P = 0.038); there was no significant difference 
in respondents’ perceived fit for the male founding CEOs of ven-
tures catering to male- versus female-dominated industries (fit diff = 
0.08, P = 0.956). See Fig. 4 for details.
We then tested for perceived fit as a mediator to help explain the 
association between our experimental conditions and investment 
outcomes. The mediation models running the R mediation package 
on 10,000 bootstrapped samples were suggestive of mediation, with 
95% confidence intervals (CIs) that did not include zero for indirect 
effects of the mediation path running from experimental condition 
through perceived fit to our outcome measures of logged funding 
and logged valuation; see Table 6 for full details.
Additional analyses
Using the study 2 response data on funding allocations and valua-
tion amounts for each venture evaluated by our investor participants, 
we were also able to calculate an implied equity percentage remain-
ing for each founding CEO based on the post-money valuation of 
each venture with the following formula:
Fig. 1. Study 1 female founding CEO disadvantage by industry type. Figure 
reflects average raw funding amounts as U.S. dollars in millions; P values reflect 
natural log of funds raised “ln funding” to account for potential skewness (38). Fig-
ure indicates that female founding CEOs raise significantly less than male founding 
CEOs when serving male- but not female-dominated industries. See Fig. 2 for addi-
tional comparisons.
Table 4. Study 1 regression results. ***P < 0.001. Robust standard errors 
clustered by venture in parentheses. 
Effect on ln 
funding: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Founding CEO 
gender −3.75*** −12.44*** −10.16***
Female = 1 (0.75) (2.05) (1.97)
Industry gender 
dominance −0.03 −0.01
Percentage 
women 
employed
(0.02) (0.02)
Founder * 
Industry 0.16*** 0.12***
Gender 
interaction (0.04) (0.04)
Founding CEO 
age 0.57
(0.38)
Venture launch location 0.54
(0.54)
Venture age 0.05
(0.12)
Venture quality 2.24***
(0.58)
Venture industry 0.01
(0.07)
Venture 
operating 
status
3.17***
(0.63)
Intercept 13.27*** 14.33*** 9.42***
(0.31) (0.84) (1.40)
Multiple R2 0.06 0.11 0.21
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.10 0.20
F statistic 24.87*** 15.63*** 11.62***
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100 * (1 – (investment amount / (investment amount + pre-money 
valuation)))
Consistent with our main analyses, we again found that female 
founding CEOs were disadvantaged, this time in terms of retained 
equity percentages, with B = −0.06, SE = 0.02, t(125) = −3.33, 
P < 0.001. Proposed investment amounts and estimated valuation 
figures provided for each opportunity implied that investors in-
tended to take a significantly higher percentage of equity from the 
ventures led by female as opposed to male founding CEOs; as a re-
sult, male founding CEOs were left with approximately 74% equity 
on average, while female founding CEOs were only left with ap-
proximately 67% on average. Notably, this supplemental analysis 
enabled us to confirm that the interaction of founding CEO gender 
and industry gender dominance was again significant as well [B = 
0.12, SE = 0.04, t(123) = 3.37, P < 0.001]. We achieved similar results 
when standardizing the numerator and denominator values for 
funding and valuation in the equation.
Post hoc comparisons of our experimental conditions using 
Tukey’s post hoc tests confirmed that a male founding CEO target-
ing a male-dominated industry retains an average 76% equity, while 
a female founding CEO targeting a male-dominated industry retains 
12% less on average for only 64% equity (P = 0.006). In contrast, a 
male founding CEO targeting a female-dominated industry retains 
an average of 71% equity—the same average percentage as that 
retained by a female founding CEO targeting a female-dominated 
industry. The equity that the female founding CEO is able to retain 
is not only on par with the amount that the male founding CEO 
retains when targeting a female-dominated industry, but the per-
centage is also roughly equivalent to the overall average retained 
equity for the entire experimental sample of 70.5%.
Aside from investigating this additional dependent variable of 
retained equity, we also explored what—if any—factor(s) can per-
haps attenuate the effects we consistently found across all of our 
outcome measures. We sought to examine investor characteristics 
more closely as external evaluations of tech organizations have 
been found to vary according to different types of investors consti-
tuting the decision makers (49). Recent research indicates that the 
gap between interactions of male and female investors with early- 
stage female-led ventures may be reduced for more experienced 
investors (50). One of the key characteristics we captured on our 
investors serving as study 2 participants is whether they qualify as 
accredited. We were able to confirm that our results do, in fact, dif-
fer according to investor accreditation status or degree of financial 
sophistication.
Welch’s t tests indicated that female founding CEOs’ disadvan-
tage in lack of fit industries may be reduced (and even emerge as 
statistically nonsignificant for certain outcomes) with greater degrees 
of investor sophistication. For accredited (versus nonaccredited) 
investors, the gap between female founding CEOs of ventures cater-
ing to female- versus male-dominated industries tightened from an 
average funding gap of $62,406 when evaluated by nonaccredited 
investors to an average funding gap of only $35,373 when evaluated 
by accredited ones (with t = 4.25, P < 0.001 declining to t = 2.80, 
P  =  0.007), from an average valuation gap of $5.0 million when 
evaluated by nonaccredited investors to an average valuation gap of 
only $1.1 million when evaluated by accredited ones (with t = 3.74, 
P < 0.001 declining to t = 1.79, P = 0.077), and from an average 
11.5% founder equity gap when evaluated by nonaccredited inves-
tors to an average founder equity gap of only 2.8% when evaluated 
Table 5. Study 2 linear mixed effects results. †P < 0.10, *P < 0.05, 
**P < 0.01, and ***P < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Effect on Ln funding Ln valuation Perceived fit
Founding CEO 
gender
−1.42*** −2.34*** −0.37***
Female = 1 (0.30) (0.35) (0.11)
Industry gender 
dominance
−0.06 −0.68† −0.08
Female 
dominated = 1
(0.30) (0.35) (0.11)
Entrepreneur * 
Industry
1.83*** 2.68*** 0.48**
Gender 
interaction
(0.43) (0.50) (0.15)
Investor gender −0.12 −0.42 −0.19
Female = 1 (0.24) (0.51) (0.16)
Investor age 0.00 −0.03 −0.01†
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Investor years of 
experience
−0.01 −0.01 −0.03
(0.04) (0.09) (0.03)
Investor 
accreditation
0.52* −1.20* 0.58***
(0.24) (0.52) (0.17)
Intercept 10.78*** 15.56*** 5.91***
(0.52) (1.06) (0.34)
Marginal R2 0.08 0.08 0.16
Sample size 130 130 130
Fig. 2. Study 1 lack of fit disadvantage by founding CEO gender. Figure reflects 
natural log of funds raised (ln funding); it indicates that female founding CEOs raise 
significantly less funding when catering to male-dominated industries that repre-
sent a lack of fit, while male founding CEOs do not raise significantly less funding 
when catering to female-dominated industries that are a lack of fit for them.
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by accredited ones (with t = 2.12, P = 0.036 declining to t = 0.52, 
P = 0.606). These results help advance recent work, which found 
some support for the assertion that evaluators lacking product knowl-
edge were more heavily influenced by gender status beliefs when 
evaluating craft beers (16).
DISCUSSION
Studies 1 and 2 make several contributions to recent research at the 
intersection of gender and venture funding (31, 48, 50–53). First, we 
not only document that a gender gap in the amount of funding 
raised persists across ventures of comparable quality and need but 
also help extend the gap to encompass the valuation at which fund-
ing is raised and the percentage of founder equity that is retained in 
the process. These three factors have key implications for success-
fully growing the venture, achieving a favorable exit for the venture, 
and subsequently starting a venture as a serial entrepreneur. Second, 
we uncover another means through which investor bias contributes 
to that gap, manifesting as a nuanced interplay of founding CEO 
and industry served that induces gendered perceptions of fit. We 
demonstrate how this perceived lack of fit operates to the detriment 
of female founding CEOs, revealing a new way in which women are 
prevented from advancing in male-dominated industries. Collectively, 
our findings indicate that only when catering to female-dominated 
industries are women able to somewhat offset the other strikes 
against them in terms of the ability to raise funding at an attractive 
valuation while retaining equity.
Rather than represent an escape from otherwise biased organiza-
tional contexts, we find that bias against women can persist even 
when seeking entrepreneurial employment opportunities, expressed 
in ways that are unique yet echo traditional employment contexts. 
In support of the Lack of Fit model (22–26), our studies jointly 
demonstrate that female, but not male, founders are disadvantaged 
for lack of industry fit in terms of both venture funding allocations 
and venture funding valuations. We offer new evidence that a con-
tinuous measure of U.S. dollars is affected by this gendered lack of 
fit, advancing recent scale and binary measure findings pertaining to 
pro duct purchases (16) and to funding decisions (48). The gender 
interaction we identify for funding allocations, venture valuations, 
and equity percentages is not only perpetuating but also aggravating 
labor market inequality by impeding women’s entry, advancement, 
and wealth accumulation as founders in male-dominated industries 
where they already suffer as employees.
In terms of practical implications, we help to dispel the miscon-
ception that women receive less funding because they start busi-
nesses in female-dominated industries that require less capital than 
male-dominated ones (54, 55). Although female-led ventures were 
associated with less funding than comparable male-led ventures across 
both of our studies, we found that female founders raised significantly 
more (not less) funding when catering to female-dominated indus-
tries considered a fit for them. Interestingly—in male-dominated 
industries constituting the majority of the labor market (2)—recent 
evidence shows that female-led ventures not only report signifi-
cantly higher profits (54) but are even able to outperform male-led 
ventures operating in those industries, conditional on receiving 
capital (48). Together, these findings suggest that investor bias thwarts 
otherwise high potential for labor market productivity and growth.
Our results can thus be conceptualized as a new type of double 
bind for women: Female founders can receive funding benefits 
from fit perceptions but only in female-dominated industries that 
represent the minority of overall labor markets (2) and are marked 
by lower earnings prospects (54, 56). While men are afforded cred-
ibility across a broad range of industries, women are instead con-
fined to effectively operate in a comparatively less lucrative subset 
of the labor market. Logic dictates that this market subset also tends 
to be relatively less familiar to male investors who represent the ma-
jority of decision makers in venture capital (2, 39), creating a unique 
barrier for founders to overcome when serving female-dominated 
industries. Fortunately, our findings point to future research directions 
exploring conditions under which the gender gap can potentially be 
reduced by intervening based on perceptions of fit.
First, we hope to breed investor awareness for an opportunity 
misperception derived from the gender interaction we identify in 
our studies, which can inhibit portfolio optimization if investors 
Fig. 4. Study 2 perceived fit differences by industry served. Perceived fit values 
reflect 1 to 7 rating scale measure responses provided by investors serving as ex-
perimental participants. Female founding CEOs catering to male-dominated (versus 
female-dominated) industries conveyed a significantly lower sense of venture-CEO 
fit, while perceived venture-CEO fit did not differ by industry served for male found-
ing CEOs.
Fig. 3. Study 2 funding allocation comparisons by founding CEO type. Figure 
reflects average raw funding allocations based on $400,000 cap across all four con-
ditions. It indicates that female founding CEOs are allocated significantly lower 
amounts of ln funding when catering to lack of fit male-dominated (versus female- 
dominated) industries, while male founding CEOs receive similar amounts regard-
less of industry fit. Note that female founding CEOs are also allocated significantly 
less than male founding CEOs for lack of fit (P < 0.001), while female founding CEOs 
do not receive significantly more than male founding CEOs for fit.
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neglect potentially viable ventures while favoring potentially unde-
serving ones. Second, the attenuating effect of financial sophistica-
tion we observe among accredited (versus nonaccredited) investors 
suggests the merits of earmarking support for investor education 
and other forms of financial literacy by public policymakers and in-
vestor groups going forward. Ultimately, this work underscores the 
need to reduce occupational segregation by gender and to promote 
women’s cross- sector representation, not only in top management 
teams but across all levels of employment. Investors appear to gain 
some comfort in parting with their funds when female founders 
serve industries where they are well represented and have come to 
be regarded as subject matter experts or to otherwise embody the 
attributes compatible for success in those fields. Future researchers 
have an opportunity to delve into the specific role violations that 
contribute to female founding CEO disadvantage and determine which 
stereotypes are being activated so they can be addressed in turn.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Study 1
We conducted study 1 using data from launch competition TCD, ven-
ture platform Crunchbase, and government platform U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics “BLS” (2). Since the event’s inception in 2010, we 
tracked and verified all ventures that launched at the U.S. TCD 
competition across the San Francisco and New  York locations 
through the time of data collection, with N = 392 ventures disclos-
ing funding outcomes. First, we gathered aggregate external capital 
raised (dilutive, not including grant, funding) from Crunchbase 
and converted raw dollar to natural log “ln funding” values to ac-
count for potential distribution skewness (38). See the Supplementary 
Materials for more details on data collection.
We then matched the Crunchbase industry classification for each 
venture to that of the BLS, which provided the most precise indica-
tion of gender dominance by industry as a continuous measure 
based on women’s percentage of employment. We arrived at our 
continuous measure of BLS percentage (mean = 44.32, SD = 17.85) 
for the industry served by each venture using the “women as per-
centage of total employed by detailed industry category” obtained 
from the “2019 annual averages of employed persons by detailed 
industry, sex, race, and Hispanic or Latino ethnicity” available via 
the BLS. We then created industry categories (male dominated, 
gender neutral, and female dominated) to separately analyze the 
data in multiple ways. See the Supplementary Materials for supple-
mental analyses on each of these categories and alternates explored.
Crunchbase served as our primary data source for variable mea-
sures of founder gender (binary measure of female founding CEO = 1, 
male founding CEO = 0) and founder age category [ordinal values 
of 0, 1, and 2 indicating whether the founding CEO was younger 
than, roughly equivalent to, or older than the 43.2 average years old 
of tech entrepreneurs with high growth new ventures (57)], as well 
as for venture industry code (Crunchbase primary industry con-
verted into numerical values from 1 to 12) and venture operating 
status (a binary measure of operating = 1 or not = 0). We separately 
obtained venture launch location (a binary measure of 0 or 1 for 
New York versus San Francisco) and launch year (2010 to 2018, 
also converted to venture age by subtracting launch year from cur-
rent year) using TCD competition details, as well as venture qual-
ity using TCD competition performance [a binary measure of 0 or 1 
indicating a TCD contestant versus a TCD selected finalist, runner- 
up, and winner, which also serves as a proxy for conferred status 
(16)]. Results reflect linear and multiple linear regressions, correla-
tion tests, as well as one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with 
Tukey’s post hoc test results for mean comparisons. We report re-
gression results both with and without control measures for com-
pleteness of interpretation and as both raw and logged variables to 
account for any skewness (38). See the Supplementary Materials for 
additional analyses and details on alternate controls (e.g., serial 
entrepreneurship and years of experience) explored as well.
Study 2
Participating investors completed an online survey, each evaluating 
four venture opportunities in a counterbalanced order that included 
two founded by female CEOs and two by male CEOs, where one 
represented a fit and another a lack of fit with industry served for 
each CEO gender (e.g., cycling through male-dominated industries 
of financial services technology and automotive technology versus 
female-dominated industries of human resources technology and 
healthcare services technology). See the Supplementary Materials 
for full procedure, including specific instructions, as well as profile 
manipulations illustrated in fig. S2. We patterned each fictitious 
Crunchbase venture profile after actual ventures in study 1’s sample. 
These were ventures that (i) were all designated as finalists in the 
TCD competitions and (ii) all raised hundreds of millions of dollars 
in funding, representing the top 3% of the study 1 venture sample.
Departing from this point of comparability, we varied the op-
portunities to maximize external and ecological validity whereby 
real-world investors typically evaluate multiple comparable yet dis-
tinct ventures at a given point in time (31). For the venture monikers, 
we created one-word names reflective of each venture that were 
standardized in terms of letter length; for the founding CEO names, 
we used the most identifiable tier of male versus female names in 
comparable socioeconomic and racial categories (58). Each profile 
included varied yet comparable venture depictions of founding 
year, location, number of employees, funding stage, year-over- year 
growth, as well as quality and status via performance at the TCD com-
petition, all representing criteria for venture quality evaluation.
Table 6. Study 2 bootstrapped multiple mediation analyses. R package mediation models with 10,000 bootstrapped samples, adjusted for investor gender, 
age, years of investing experience, and accreditation status. **P < 0.01 and ***P < 0.001. DV, dependent variables of logged funding and logged valuation; IV, 
independent variable of experimental condition. 
Study 2 model outcome Effect of IV on mediator
Effect of mediator on 
DV
Indirect effect of 
mediator 95% CI lower bound 95% CI upper bound
LnFunding 0.354** 0.653*** 0.231*** 0.11 0.37
LnValuation 0.974*** 0.347*** 0.17 0.55
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The Crunchbase profiles included three-line descriptions of the 
financial advisory, automotive sharing, employee benefits, and family 
healthcare platforms (across male- versus female-dominated indus-
tries comparable in terms of having 30 to 40% versus 70 to 80% 
employment of women), complete with comparable references to 
technology, to enabling everyday usage, and to successfully meeting 
user needs. The three lines of founder information included rein-
forcements of founding CEO role and name; references to success-
ful serial entrepreneurship; years of industry experience; degree of 
passion, preparedness, and personal pain point for the offering’s 
impact (59–61); and relevant industry certifications—all represen-
tative of criteria for venture founding team evaluation.
After reading each Crunchbase profile, participants were con-
strained to allocate funding out of a constant sum of $400,000 (31), 
as well as to provide an uncapped valuation at which they would 
invest in each venture. Each participant viewed these four ventures 
in random order before providing the requisite dollar funding and 
valuation amounts, as well as seven-point rating scale evaluations, 
indicating the extent to which each venture conveyed a sense of 
(i) venture quality, (ii) trust in the CEO’s ability to execute, and 
(iii) fit between the CEO and the venture opportunity. As a testa-
ment to the comparability of our manipulated profiles, we observed 
nonsignificant results for rating scale response comparisons per-
taining to the quality of each standalone venture and trust in each 
standalone CEO’s ability to execute. Our participants thus confirmed 
that these ventures signaled comparable venture quality and CEO 
trust, but participants were nonetheless swayed by the industry 
fit and lack of industry fit derived from randomized entrepreneur- 
and-venture combinations that they assessed, as hypothesized.
Applying linear mixed effects modeling to test for our main and 
interaction effects, we nested the 520 venture evaluations within the 
130 investor participants performing the evaluations (62–63). We 
kept the linear mixed models with all control variables intact and 
constructed a 1-1-1 mediation model for the funding and valuation 
amounts allocated to each startup, predicted by the experimental 
condition and a measured mediator of perceived fit associated with 
each venture opportunity (64). These 10,000 bootstrapped multiple 
mediation analyses tested whether the measured fit variable ap-
peared to mediate the impact of the experimental conditions on 
funding allocations and valuation estimates while still accounting 
for multiple observations per subject and the personal attributes of 
each subject that could potentially affect investment judgments. As 
in study 1, we again performed all statistical analyses on both raw 
dollar values and natural log values to account for potential distri-
bution skewness (38), as well as both with and without our control 
variables, finding consistency across all tests.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
Supplementary material for this article is available at http://advances.sciencemag.org/cgi/
content/full/6/48/eabd7664/DC1
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